police and active serving soldiers, as well as an investigatory policy that is cautious about criminal investigations, more clarity was needed from the Court. As the judgment fails to set out unambiguous legal obligations, it is unlikely that the judgment will have an impact on investigatory policy.
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auspices of an international organization. Such multinational operations elicit the question as to whom violations are attributable. Jaloud presents us with exactly this complicated picture.
In theory, the issues of jurisdiction and attribution are conceptually separate. Jurisdiction pertains to the geographical scope of a human rights obligation and is governed by primary norms of human rights treaties. Attribution, for its part, pertains to the imputation of acts committed by natural persons to legal persons such as States or international organizations, and is governed by secondary rules of international responsibility. In spite of their different operation and goals, jurisdiction and attribution are related; to properly conduct the jurisdictional inquiry, it should first be established who exactly is the duty-bearing entity. Only when it is clear that acts can indeed be attributed to the State -and, for instance, not to an international organization -can one examine the jurisdictional relationship between the State and the alleged victim. 5 In Behrami, for instance, the ECtHR did not reach this second stage of the inquiry as it held that the impugned acts in Kosovo were attributable to the United Nations, and not to a State. 6 Sometimes the question of attribution is skipped and the Court immediately delves into the jurisdictional issue; this may happen when no other potentially responsible actor is on the horizon and attribution to the defending State is self-evident.
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Jaloud in essence follows the Behrami line of argument, but it does so in a somewhat confusing manner, subsuming the attribution analysis in the jurisdictional one. This merger of jurisdiction and attribution predictably elicited criticism from a minority of judges, who took issue with the Court's conflation of jurisdiction and the principle of State responsibility, and even 5 In the third and final stage then, in case the ECtHR has held that an individual fell within the jurisdiction of the State, will it ascertain whether the State has also committed a wrongful act vis-à-vis the individual, and whether the State's responsibility under the ECHRcould accordingly be engaged. See section 2 for critical reflections on the applicable standard for wrongful conduct in overseas military operations. Apparently contra Sari, above n. 3 (writing that "jurisdiction comes first and attribution of wrongful conduct second"). Sari, however, does not make a distinction between what Milanovic has called attribution of jurisdictionestablishing conduct, and attribution of violation-establishing conduct. The latter attribution operation indeed occurs in the final stage, after a finding of jurisdiction, but the former occurs prior to the finding of jurisdiction as it is concerned with identifying whose jurisdiction we are looking into. However that may be, the fact remains that the ECtHR attributed the impugned conduct to the Netherlands, as a result of which the relevant inquiry shifted to the jurisdictional issue. It is pointed out that jurisdiction is a stand-alone question that in many situations is not clouded by the question of attribution, simply because the answer to the latter is straightforward, e.g., when the military operation was not carried out in a multinational framework. This implies that the answer which the ECtHR gives to the jurisdictional question is applicable to any military or law-enforcement operation abroad.
In Jaloud, the issue of jurisdiction received at first sight only scant attention from the ECtHR.
After reiterating its previous stance regarding jurisdiction (which it had set out in its earlier judgment in Al-Skeini) 13 in just one paragraph, the Court considered itself to be satisfied that the Netherlands exercised its jurisdiction "within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint". 14 "Checkpoint" had never before been considered as a jurisdictional trigger. This may lead one to believe that the Court is coining a new jurisdictional standard, "checkpoint jurisdiction", but, In Jaloud, the Court may have clarified that individuals injured by shots from a checkpoint fall within the jurisdiction of the State controlling the checkpoint, thereby opening the door for 
The scope of the duty to investigate
From the interview with the Dutch legal advisor, it can also be distilled that the implications of Jaloud for Dutch authorities' scope of the duty to investigate the use of lethal force in out-ofarea military operations remain unclear and contested. It is recalled that, in Jaloud, the Court, dealing with the merits of the case, held that the Netherlands had failed to discharge its procedural obligations under Article 2 ECHR. Citing insufficient cooperation with Dutch judicial authorities, witness collusion, unsatisfactory autopsy and disappeared evidence, the averring that "it cannot be found that these failings were inevitable, even in the particularly difficult conditions prevailing in Iraq at the relevant time", 27 the Court did not explain how it weighed these local conditions, which were very relevant for three of the four grounds of non- In the remainder of this article, we will delve into how the Netherlands attempted to balance these imperatives before Jaloud and evaluate the prospects of the investigatory standards laid down in Jaloud -to the extent that they are clear to the military in the first place -being implemented. Understanding the policy at the time of the Jaloud incident, and appreciating the prospects for implementation requires us to first reconstruct, with a socio-legal approach, the Netherlands' reaction to a prior incident, involving Eric O.
The prelude to Jaloud: Eric O.
The fatal shooting in the case of Jaloud and the investigation that followed took place in the aftermath of another fatal shooting in Iraq; an Iraqi citizen had been killed on 27 December 2003 in an incident that is known in the Netherlands as the case of Eric O. The facts in Eric O.
were similar to those in Jaloud in that it was a road-side incident in which a Dutch military officer perceived a threat and fired his weapon, which resulted in the death of an unarmed Iraqi citizen. In the case of Eric O., a full criminal investigation was started. After consultation with the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (PPS), the RNLM arrested and charged Dutch sergeantmajor Eric O. 34 He was immediately transferred to the Netherlands for prosecution. In a habeas corpus procedure on 6 January 2004, an investigating judge ordered the release of Eric O. on the grounds that the PPS had presented insufficient evidence to justify a criminal charge and 32 Jaloud case, Joint concurring opinion of judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefevre, Sikuta, Hirvela, Lopez Guerra, Sajo and Silvis. 33 Idem, paras. 5-7. 34 In the Netherlands, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNLM) is the military police force responsible for criminal investigations during military missions abroad. While its law enforcement tasks are supervised by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (PPS), which falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, RNLM officers fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. The PPS, assisted by a specialized military legal department, decides on the type and depth of the investigations. IT, pp. 2-6.
